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INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS IN SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM:
LESSONS FROM ABROAD AND SPECIAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR WOMEN
BY KAREN E. MENTER
Within the past few decades many countries have
established individual accounts as a part of their national
retirement system. The characteristics of these individual account
systems vary greatly among countries. This essay will examine a
system comprised entirely of mandatory individual accounts
(Chile), one that has voluntary individual accounts as a carve-out
of social security benefits (United Kingdom), and one that has
mandatory individual accounts as a carve-out of social security
benefits (Sweden). When discussing individual accounts various
issues arise including transition costs, management of funds, and
administrative costs. Depending on their system, countries have
responded to these issues differently. The experiences of other
countries and their responses to the problems they have faced serve
as lessons to the United States as it discusses incorporating
individual accounts into its social security system.
This article summarizes the national retirement systems in
place in Chile, the UK and Sweden followed by a discussion of the
aforementioned three issues and what the policy implications could
be or should be for the United States. Finally, there is an analysis
of how women fared under these systems and issues that American
women should be informed of as discussions of Social Security
reform continue.
SUMMARY OF PENSION SYSTEM
CHILE
During the 1970s Chile's retirement system was stressed.
Fewer and fewer workers were supporting each retiree, down from
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12 workers per retiree in 1955 to 2.5 in 1979.' In addition, the
system was highly complex with over 100 retirement plans
resulting in an assortment of contribution rates and benefits. 2In
1981, to correct these problems within the retirement system, the
Chilean government became the first country in the world to
switch from a pay-go system to a system of mandatory individual
accounts.
The new system mandated that new entrants to the labor
force (and old workers who opted in to the new system) contribute
10 percent of earnings (pretax) to an individual account as well as
approximately 3 percent additional to cover disability insurance
and life insurance.3 Employers and the self-employed are not
required to contribute; however, the self-employed can set up
retirement accounts in a similar manner at their choosing.'
Upon retirement, individuals have choices as to the
distribution of their accounts. The first option is an annuity
providing a life-long benefit. In Chile, annuities must be indexed
for inflation and include survivor benefits. The second alternative
is called a programmed withdrawal Though determined annually
according to life expectancy and account balance, this option tends
to provide larger monthly benefit. However, this option can also
result in very small benefits and perhaps outliving resources
entirely in later years of retirement.6
An important component of the reformed Chilean
retirement system is the minimum benefit guarantee. The
1Jan Walliser & Scott M. Becker, Congressional Budget Office, Social Security
Privatization: Experiences Abroad 11 (1999), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/l0xx/doc1065/ssabroad.pdf.2id.
' Id. at 13. Although CBO puts the disability and life insurance figure at three
percent, Turner indicates a range of 2.50 percent to 3.74 percent. JOHN TURNER,
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. DEBATE 44 (2006).
4 CBO, supra note 1, at 12-13.
5 Id. at 13-14; see also JOHN B. WILLIAMSON, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE,
AN UPDATE ON CHILE'S EXPERIENCE WITH PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION AND
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS 3 (2005), available at
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/2005_19_chile.pdf.
6 Williamson, supra note 5, at 3.
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minimum benefit is roughly the equivalent of 75 percent of
minimum wage and is funded by general revenues. There is a
minimum benefit guarantee for workers contributing for 20 or
more years who do not have enough funds to pay for a minimum
benefit defined by the government.7 The minimum benefit also
applies to retirees who chose to take scheduled withdrawals and
have exhausted their funds. Additionally, workers who contribute
for less than 20 years receive an anti-poverty benefit.8
UNITED KINGDOM
Since the passage of the Old-Age Pensions Act in 1908, the
UK has had a minimum poverty level benefit for workers.9 This
first tier benefit was not earnings related. Public pensions were not
related to earnings until the implementation of the graduated
pension in 1961.' o The second tier offered low benefits and did
not cover all of the working population. Workers could opt-out of
this public pension system as long as they were enrolled in an
employer defined benefit program called occupational pensions."
Over time the second tier evolved. A reform in 1986 allowed
workers to opt- out to establish an individual retirement account or
appropriate personal pension (APP). 2 More recently (2001)
stakeholder pensions were introduced targeted at workers who earn
close to the national median but are still without a private pension
7 CBO, supra note 1, at 14.
8 See Barbara E. Kritzer, Recent Changes to the Chilean System of Individual
Accounts, 64 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 66, 66 (2001/2002), available at
http://www.retirement.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v64n4/v64n4p66.pdf; see also
Turner, supra note 3, at 45.
9 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: INFORMATION ON
USING A VOLUNTARY APPROACH TO INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS 36 (2003); see also
Gregory N. Filosa, Note, International Pension Reform: Lessons for the United
States, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 133, 147 (2005).
I0 in 1978, the benefit was renamed State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme or
SERPS. Lillian Liu, Retirement Income Security in the United Kingdom, 62
SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 23, 26 (1999), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v62nl/v62nlI23.pdf.
11 Id.
12 CBO, supra note 1, at 33.
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plan.'3 In 2002 SERPS became State Second Pension (S2P) which
initially offered an earnings-related benefit but, as of 2007, it offers
a flat-rate benefit through contributions that are earnings related.
Low-income earners were thus encouraged to stay within the
system, while higher income earners were encouraged to opt-out. 14
This paper will focus on the 1986 reform allowing appropriate
personal pensions.
Contribution rates to the voluntary individual account are
the same as if an individual had not decided to opt-out 5 and
employers are still mandated to contribute their normal amount. 6
Employees contribute "2% on the first £64 (about U.S.$100) of
weekly earnings, plus 10% on weekly earnings between £64 and
£485 (about U.S. $800); employers pay 3%-10% of employee's
weekly earnings up to £485 according to wage brackets, plus 10%
of total additional earnings."17 Contributions are remitted to the
National Insurance Fund throughout the year.' 8 The money is held
there for approximately 18 months. 19 Then the Department of
Social Security pays a rebate to the workers directly into their
APP.20 As age increases, so does the rebate from a low of 3.4
percent to a maximum of 9 percent of earnings.2' Individuals with
an APP also receive a 1 percent rebate of their income tax, which
was devised as an incentive to encourage workers to choose
APPs.
22
Sometime between ages 60 and 75, workers with an APP
must annuitize to the extent that their account was funded by tax
13 SOPHIE M. KORCZYK, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, WOMEN AND
INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS IN CHILE, AUSTRALIA, AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM 26 (2003), available at
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/2003 09 wmnss.pdf.
14 Id. at 25; see also Turner supra note 3, at 49.
"5 David Blake & John Turner, AARP Public Policy Institute, Voluntary Carve
Outs for Social Security Reform: Lessons from the United Kingdom 3 (2005).
16 KORCZYK, SUPRA NOTE 13, AT 27.
17 LIU, SUPR NOTE 10, AT 26.8 CBO, SUPRA NOTE 1, AT 33.
'9 BLAKE, SUPRA NOTE 15, AT 3.20 CBO, SUPRA NOTE 1, AT 33.
21 id
22 1d at 34.
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rebates and government rebates. This gives individuals the benefit
of annuitizing at times when the interest rates are relatively high.
For a married person, an annuity must provide a 50 percent
survivor's benefit.23  For the remainder of the account, an
individual may take up to a 25 percent lump sum payment.
However, the balance of the account must be annuitized or
scheduled lifetime withdrawals taken. There is no minimum
benefit guarantee within the APP system, though participants are
still eligible for the minimum poverty level benefit.24
SWEDEN
The old Swedish pension system consisted of two tiers.
The first was a basic minimum pension which was not means-
tested, while the second was an earnings-related benefit. Both
were financed through a pay-go system solely made up of
employer contributions. In total, the two pensions equaled about
65 percent of the "average income based on the best 15 years of at
least 30 years of employment.... ,,25 Reforms in 1994 and 1998
changed the defined benefit system to an amalgamation made up of
defined benefit and defined contribution characteristics.
The current pension system in Sweden consists of three
tiers. First is the guaranteed pension which is a means-tested basic
minimum benefit. 26 It is funded through general revenues. 27 The
second is an earnings-related supplementary benefit financed
through a pay-go system. The third tier is the premium pension,
which is the defined contribution portion of the Swedish system.28
Through employer and employee contributions, 2.5 percent of
23 BLAKE, SUPRA NOTE 15, AT 4.
24 CBO, supra note 1, at 35; see also GAO, supra note 8, at 45.
25 KAREN M. ANDERSON, PENSION POLITICS IN THREE SMALL STATES: DENMARK,
SWEDEN, AND THE NETHERLANDS, 29 CANADIAN J. SOC. 289,293 (SPRING 2004).
26 JOHN TURNER, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS:
LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, 1 (2003), [hereinafter INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS:
LESSONS FROM SWEDEN], available at http://0-
assets.aarp.org.mill 1 .sjlibrary.org/rgcenter/econ/ib60 swe iap.pdf.
27 Anderson, supra note 25, at 293.
28 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 1.
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earnings are placed into individual accounts.29 The premium
pension does not provide any disability benefits."
When a worker first claims premium pension benefits, the
entire balance of the account must be annuitized. Annuities can be
taken as fixed or variable and participants also have the choice of
single annuity or a joint and survivors' annuity.3' Annuities are
provided either by the Swedish government or by a company of its
choice.32 The mandatory annuitization of individual accounts
serves to reduce risk by providing timing options of annuitizing
and partial annuitizing.33
TRANSITION COSTS
CHILE
Workers who decided not to switch to the new system and
retirees already receiving benefits continued to contribute and
receive benefits as they did under the old system. However, the
Chilean government had to decide how to compensate workers
who had contributed to the pay-go system but switched to the new
system. First, employers were directed to give a one-time 18
percent wage increase to those workers roughly equivalent to the
employer's previous contribution to the pay-go system. 4 This was
29Id at 2; see also Elizabeth Tedrow, Social Security Privatization in Other
Countries - What Lessons Can be Learned for the United States, 14 Elder L.J.
35, 53 (2006); see also Anderson, supra note 25, at 293. The total contribution
rate is roughly equivalent to rates under the old system when factoring in the 16
percent that goes towards the second tier pension. There is no discussion about
the ratio between employee contribution rates and employer contributions ratio
for the 2.5%. See INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note
26, at 2.
30 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 2.
3Id. at 9-10; see also LAWRENCE H. THOMSON, URBAN INSTITUTE,
ADMINISTERING INDIvIDUAL ACCOUNTS IN SOCIAL SECURITY: THE ROLE OF
VALUES AND OBJECTIVES IN SHAPING OPTIONS 14 (1999), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/retire_1.pdf.
32 Thompson, supra note 31.
33 Id. at 14-15; see also INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra
note 26, at 9.
34 Williamson, supra note 5, at 1.
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instituted so that employees would receive the same compensation
under the new system as they had under the old system.35 In
addition, workers who made the switch were given "recognition
bonds," but only if they had twelve monthly contributions in the
last five years. The value of the bond was determined with a
complex, four- part calculation.36 At retirement the value of the
bond is added to the pension fund, often accounting for a large part
of a retiree's income.37
As a result of the social security reform, the Chilean
government had to decide how to finance these extra expenses. In
preparation for the pension reform, there was a major tax reform in
1975. This raised tax revenues by simultaneously launching a
value-added tax, simplifying the income tax, and strengthening tax
enforcement. By the time the pension reform was implemented,
Chile registered a surplus of 5.5 percent of GDP.38
UNITED KINGDOM
In order to entice workers to opt-in to an APP, the UK
government had to provide incentives. It did this by offering
incentive payments, tax rebates, contribution rebates, and a small
reduction in future rebates which all resulted in a favorable
situation for workers.39 This arrangement was costly to the UK,
though it is hard to pinpoint an exact figure for a few reasons.
First, those opting out of SERPS only accounted for a small
portion of the population, around 15 percent. Second, opting out is
not permanent.4 ' An individual may opt back into SERPS in
subsequent years so there is no way to know how long an
individual will be a part of SERPS. 1
Transition costs have been managed in the UK by utilizing
laxity in the National Insurance Fund (NIF). The NIF regularly
" CBO, supra note 1, at 12; see also Korczyk, supra note 13, at 9.
16 CBO, supra note 1, at 15.
17 Williamson, supra note 5, at 1-2.
" CBO, supra note 1, at 16.
39 Blake, supra note 15, at 6; see also Tedrow, supra note 29, at 48.
40 Liu, supra note 10, at 33.
41 Thompson, supra note 31.
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offsets its account by using funds from general revenue. As a
result, the UK government is not overtly concerned with transition
costs.42 Additionally, contribution rates to the NIF can be altered
up to 1 percent without Parliamentary approval. 43 The structure of
the SERPS program has also helped ease transition costs. Because
it is a relatively new program, not many individuals are currently
receiving benefits under SERPS. The UK government has also cut
future benefit levels from 25 percent of income to 20 percent of
income.44
SWEDEN
The transition in Sweden to the new partially defined
contribution system is expected to take around 20 years.45 A major
cost during the transition will be the creation of a new government
department, the Premium Pension Agency (PPM in Swedish). The
PPM serves as the clearinghouse for the entire premium pension
tier. Though envisioned to be self-financing, high start-up costs
forced the PPM to borrow from the government.46
Another cost during this transition is an education
campaign by the National Swedish Social Insurance Board.
Workers are confronted with numerous investment choices47 and
the government tries to ensure that workers understand their
options and make informed decisions. Three main groups were
targeted: 1) motivated participants with investment experience, 2)
unmotivated participants with no desire to choose funds and 3)
motivated participants who lacked knowledge to make informed
42 Liu, supra note 10, at 34; see also Tedrow, supra note 29, at 48.
43 CBO, supra note 1, at 35.
44 Id. at 36.
45 Anderson, supra note 25, at 295.46 JOHN TURNER, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR
SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATE ACCOUNTS 2 (2005), [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE
COSTS] available at RLINK"http://www.aarp.org/research/legis-
polit/ssreform/fs120 ss costs.html"http://www.aarp.org/research/legis-
polit/ssreform/fsl20 ss costs.html; see also INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS
FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 2.
47 There are 660 funds which Swedes can choose from. Tedrow, supra note 29,
at 53.
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investment decisions. The educational campaign aimed to provide
information to all three groups through mailings, public service
announcements, and advertisements.48 Educational campaigns
were also run by management companies before the switch in
systems occurred to entice workers. Their costs amounted to
approximately $94.4 million.4 9
IMPLICATIONS TO THE US
The US, if it chooses to reform its pensions system to
include individual accounts, will undoubtedly incur transition
costs. For example, contributors to the Social Security system will
want the benefits they were guaranteed and a government agency
may need to be created or a current one improved upon. Knowing
that these costs will be incurred means the government has to plan
for these costs. Executing changes in taxation prior to a reform of
the pension system, like Chile did in reforming the tax system six
years ahead of the pension reform, would be of great benefit to the
American people. Rarely do Americans favor tax increases so that
is probably not a viable option, but stronger enforcement of current
tax laws in conjunction with minor changes to the tax code could
heighten revenue enough to make a major change to the pension
system workable.
While planning ahead may be difficult to do, it is
necessary. The UK did not plan ahead for costs incurred during
the implementation of the APPs. However, the UK has flexibility
in raising revenue that is not available in the US. For instance,
when the NIF needs more money it can borrow from general
revenue or raise contribution rates. Such laxity is not found in the
American political system and it is highly unlikely that pension
reform would be accompanied by such elastic regulations.
The creation of the PPM in Sweden meant Sweden incurred
transition costs. However, the US does not necessarily need to
create a new agency if it decides to change its pension system. An
individual account pension system could be run through the Social
48 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 8.
49 Tedrow, supra note 29, at 53.
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Security Administration or the Federal Retirement Thrift
Investment Board, both of which are highly involved with the
public or state pension systems. Certainly there would be some
costs incurred from such expenditures as training and hiring new
employees, but the costs would be comparatively less than in
Sweden because an entirely new department would not need to be
constructed. Additionally, the agency could be structured in such a
way as to be self-financing after a short transition period as the
PPM is in Sweden (discussed later in this paper).
MANAGEMENT OF FUNDS
CHILE
AFPs are government authorized companies created solely
to manage pension funds. ° There were originally twelve AFPs in
existence but that number has fluctuated from twenty-one in 1993
to a low of six in 2005."' Workers are allowed to choose the AFP
they desire to manage their account but, initially, the AFPs could
only manage one fund.52 In addition, in the early years of the
individual account system, individuals were allowed to switch
between AFPs as much as they wanted as long as they transferred
their entire account. 53  This fostered a competitive relationship
between AFPs, which was motivated by commissions the AFPs'
employees enjoyed upon enticing new clients. 4 However, the
competition between AFPs and the individuals' ability to switch
between AFPs did not result in a better financial situation for
Chilean workers. Instead, the system's design encouraged AFPs to
adopt the same general investment strategy. Heavy penalties
accrued for falling outside specific levels of return during the
twelve month accounting period, resulting in AFPs making low
risk investments.5
5o Williamson, supra note 5, at 1.
51 Williamson, supra note 5, at 4.
52 Id at 5; see also Thompson supra note 31.
53 Thompson, supra note 3 1, at 7.
54 Turner, supra note 3, at 58.
55 Williamson, supra note 5, at 5.
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Over the years, the Chilean government has enacted
significant changes to AFPs and the way they manage individual
accounts. In 1997, a minimum stay requirement was enacted
forcing individuals to remain with an AFP for at least six months.56
Two years later, the accounting period gradually began to shift
from twelve months to thirty-six months. A second fund (Fund 2)
was permitted by law in 2000. Only individuals within 10 years of
retirement were eligible for this conservative fund which could
only be invested in fixed-rate instruments.
Within a few years, the system went through another
overhaul. AFPs were forced to provide four different types of
funds (simply called Fund B, C, D, and E). AFPs were also given
the option of offering Fund A but were not so mandated.57 Fund 2
became Fund E, and is the most conservative fund. Fund 1 (the
only Fund available before 2000) became Fund C. Fund A, the
optional offering, is the riskiest fund in the Chilean system.5 8 The
difference between funds is the "maximum percentage that they
may invest in variable-rate instruments (such as equities) and fixed
income (such as bank deposits, mortgages, or government paper
that offer a low level of risk of variability). ' 5 9 Individuals can
designate the funds in which they wish to invest (in any ratio that
they desire) with few restrictions.6" Men over age 55 and women
over age 50 are not allowed to allocate their pension to Fund A. If,
upon retirement, an individual keeps a portion of their pension
fund in an AFP, they are only allowed to use Funds C, D, and E.6
Workers who do not designate their fund allocation are placed in
funds dependent upon their age.
The government does provide a minimum and maximum
guaranteed rate of return. If AFPs fall below the guaranteed rate,
they must use a special reserve fund, which was designed
specifically for this purpose, to meet the minimum rate of return.
If that does not cover the difference, then they must use corporate
56 Turner, supra note 3, at 58.
51 Williamson, supra note 5, at 5; Kritzer, supra note 8, at 68.
58 Williamson, supra note 5, at 5.
59 Kritzer, supra note 8, at 67.60 Id. at 68-69.
61 Williamson, supra note 5, at 5.
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assets to obtain the needed money. In situations where the fund is
unable to provide all the accounts with the minimum benefit, the
government provides the necessary money. The AFP's funds are
then disbanded and the accounts are switched to other funds.
When AFPs exceed the maximum rate of return, the excess is
placed into the reserve fund.62
Under the new reforms the minimum and maximum rates
of return differ among funds.63 Generally, rates of return in the
Chilean system have been high. The gross annual return (inflation
adjusted) has been more than 10 percent from 1981 until 2002.
However, high administrative costs have cut into the rate of return
that workers in the system actually enjoy.'
UNITED KINGDOM
APPs are managed through financial institutions such as
banks, mortgage companies and insurance companies.65
Individuals are allowed to choose whichever provider they desire.66
Each financial institution offers multiple investment plans with
different risk levels among which the individual can choose to
allocate funds.67 There is no guaranteed rate of return in the UK's
system."8 The UK government imposes few regulations over the
financial institutions that hold the APPs.69 One is that APPs should
only be encouraged when it is in the best interest of the worker.70
Additionally, providers must adhere to the prudent-man rule
meaning that investments must be diversified. "No more than 10
percent of investments may be made in the same asset, and plans
may not invest more than 5 percent in the company offering the
plan." 7
1
6 21 d. at 6-7.
631d. at 7-8.
6 Id. at 7; see also Korczyk, supra note 13, at 11.
65 GAO, supra note 8, at 42; see also Liu, supra note 10, at 28.
66 Liu, supra note 10, at 28.
67 GAO, supra note 8, at 45.
68 Blake, supra note 15, at 9.
69 Thompson, supra note 31, at 13.
70 Turner, supra note 3, at 83.
71 CBO, supra note 1, at 37.
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This lack of governmental oversight has caused problems
within the APP system. Specifically, shortly after the 1988 reform,
financial institutions aggressively marketed APPs to individuals
who would be better off staying with SERPS/S2P. 2 In excess of 2
million people, or more than 40 percent of individuals who initially
opted to participate in APPs, were affected.73 Compensation by the
financial institutions to the misled workers has totaled
approximately $19.4 billion.74  In response to the "mis-selling
scandal" the UK government implemented new regulations. Only
trained individuals can work as pension advisers and they must use
a computer program to evaluate if APPs are proper and beneficial
to the worker. Pension advisors must attach an explanation as to
why the APP is in the best interest of the worker. In addition, each
recommendation is double- checked and workers are allotted a 14
day period in which they can cancel the contract.75
In contrast to the financial institutions involved in the mis-
selling scandal, two large insurance companies advised hundreds
of thousands of clients, that it was not in their economic best
interest to remain in the APP system.76  Every 5 years, the
Government Actuary's Department (GAD) reevaluates the
reduction in social security benefits and the contribution to
individual accounts.77 In 2004, Prudential and Norwich Union
informed their clients that the new rate was too low. That year
alone, 500,000 individuals left their APPs and returned to
SERPS/S2P, a dramatic increase due to the insurance companies'
advice.
While those workers were well-informed of the status of
their accounts, other workers struggle to find information about
their own situation. Information on financial institutions' rates of
return is not available, thus making an informed decision about
7' Turner, supra note 3, at 83; see also GAO, supra note 8, at 43; see also Blake,
supra note 15, at 9.
7' Blake, supra note 15, at 9.
74 GAO, supra note 8, at 43.
75 CBO, supra note 1, at 38.
76 Blake, supra, note 15, at 5.77Id. at4.
781 Id. at 5.
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which financial institution to choose nearly impossible.
Furthermore, "active fund management [does] not necessarily
deliver superior investment returns."7 9  Information on rate of
return is scarce and the affects on retiree income will not be seen
until around 2020.80
SWEDEN
Numerous funds are available for workers investment. In
2000, 455 funds were available, growing to 625 in 2002.1 By
2006 the number had reached 660.2 Mutual funds must be
licensed in Sweden to be registered with the PPM. In addition,
funds are mandated to consistently provide information on
expenses of the fund and the rate of return. Mutual fund
companies can manage up to 25 funds per company or 50 when a
corporation owns several mutual fund companies.83 Funds must
meet the European Union's diversity requirements excluding
Swedish equity funds which are dominated by a single company.'
Individuals are free to choose the fund or funds (up to 5)5
in which they invest. In 2001, two thirds of workers chose to
actively invest their contributions. In 2001, only 18 percent of new
participants elected to make an investment decision.86 When
workers decide not to make an investment choice their contribution
is put into the government's default fund. This fund aims to
achieve higher than average rate of return with little risk.87 The
government offers one other fund which workers must specify.
The second fund can invest 100 percent in equities whereas the
first fund can only invest between 80 and 90 percent in equities.
88
79Liu, supra note 10, at 36.
80 Id; see also Korczyk, supra note 13, at 29.
8" INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 25, at 3-4.
82 Tedrow, supra note 29, at 53.
83 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 4.
84 Turner, supra note 3, at 54-55.
85 Tedrow, supra note 29, at 53.
86 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 7.
87 /d. at 4.
8 Id. at 5.
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There is one partial rate of return guarantee in the Swedish
system. This occurs during the holding period between time of
contribution and the placement of funds in the PPM. Contributions
are only placed in PPMs one week a year so there is a holding
period of roughly one year.89 During this time there is a set rate of
return on contributions. In 2001, it was 3.5 percent, near the rate
of return on government debt.9" There are no other guaranteed
rates of return in the entire Swedish system.9' Many funds,
upwards of 60 percent, were established upon the implementation
of the premium pension. For those funds, rates of return in past
years were not available.92 In the early years of the premium
pension the world equity market did not do well leading to
negative rates of return ranging from -7.4 percent in 2000 for the
default fund to -33.1 percent in 2002 for funds chosen by active
participants of the premium system.93 There is some concern that
the default plan may be jeopardizing the rate of return for ethical
reasons because the government will not invest in companies that
have violated human rights, child labor laws, and environmental
protection laws. 94 However, it is too early to tell what result the
ethical standards will have on rate of return in the long run.
IMPLICATIONS TO THE US
One important factor the US needs to consider when
discussing individual accounts is the financial sophistication of
individuals. There are diverse education levels among Americans,
and there would likely be differing interest levels in individual
accounts. A lot of choices, as in Sweden, would frustrate those
without significant knowledge of financial markets, whereas
limited choices, as in Chile, would frustrate the financially savvy.
Both Sweden and Chile offer a government- managed fund for
89 Turner, supra note 3, at 52-53.
90 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 3.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 4.
93 Turner, supra note 3, at 57-58.
94 Id. at 56; see also INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra
note 26, at 5.
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those that do not want to make their own choice. This is a good
idea for the US government to include in pension reform.
Although it would directly involve the government in managing
pension funds, it would ease the burden on the current Social
Security system (independent of the form that the individual
accounts take). In addition, it would provide a safe option to those
with limited or non-existent investment experience.
Sweden's particular system of managing funds would not
work well in the US because all contributions are placed in mutual
funds in only a single week. If the US were to apply such a
system, the affect on financial markets would be significant. The
US must create a system that would not distort the domestic or
international financial market considerably because dramatic
swings in the market would have far reaching consequences.
The most important lesson to learn from Chilean and the
UK experiences is that reforms may be necessary to correct
unexpected results and to create the best system for the individual
country as possible. Sweden will probably have reforms to make
to the system, but because of the pension reform's short existence
there is no history in this area. It is important for the US to take
time to plan a good, sound system, but it is more important that the
system is reviewed regularly to identify any problem areas and
work on improvements.
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
CHILE
Administrative costs in the Chilean individual account
system run quite high. AFPs are allowed to charge management
fees for "new accounts, mandatory contributions, voluntary
contributions, transfers from one pension fund to another in excess
of two transfers per year, and scheduled withdrawals.' 95  In
addition, if a retiree chooses to annuitize, the AFP can charge an
additional fee up to 5.3 percent of account balances. 96 Fees cannot
be charged based upon the amount held in a pension fund which
" Korczyk, supra note 13, at 10.
96 ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, supra note 46, at 2.
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forces the AFPs to charge fees on contributions. In turn, this
forces current contributors to support the management of funds for
inactive contributors.97
Generally, low-income earners have a higher percentage of
their contributions going to cover fees than high-income earners.9"
However, for both low-income and high-income earners, the
percent of contributions covering fees varies depending on the
AFP they use. For low-income earners, 8.99 percent to 29.7
percent of contributions went to pay for administrative fees as of
September 2002. High-income earners had rates of 1.02 percent to
24.2 percent. 99 When considering average rate of return in light of
administrative costs, rates drop from over 10 percent to around 7
percent. 100
There have been successful legislative efforts to reduce fees
that AFPs can charge resulting in the government mandating a
reduction in fees. However, such reductions have been delayed so
administrative costs still run extremely high.' To Americans used
to the low administrative costs associated with Social Security, the
high administrative costs of the Chilean system would be
unacceptable even when the reforms are in place. But for
Chileans, the administrative costs in the current system (without
reforms) are equivalent, or perhaps less, 0 2 than the inefficient pay-
go system and the system provides greater benefits at retirement.
0 3
UK
Administrative costs run high in the UK system of APPs.
The costs stems from front-loading charges, high annual
management fees, and monthly management fees.'0 4 Some fees are
97 CBO, supra note 1, at 22.
98 Williamson, supra note 5, at 8.
99 Korczyk, supra note 13, at 11.
100 Id.; see also Williamson, supra note 5, at 8.
101 Kritzer, supra note 8, at 68.
.02 ,,. the total costs of the new system are 42 percent lower than the average
costs of the old pay-as-you-go system. . ." CBO, supra note 1, at 23.
103 Thompson, supra note 31, at 3.
104 Blake, supra note 15, at 9; see also Liu, supra note 10, at 36.
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even indexed to wage and price increases." 5 Administrative costs
decline when workers stay with the APPs for longer periods of
time (because of the front-loading charges). In 1998, fees reduced
average gain by 3.2 percent of assets yearly over a 10- year period
and 1.7 percent when over a 25- year period. 6  Fees for
annuitizing benefits run even higher, upwards of 10 percent of the
value of benefits received by retirees.?17 This results in a reduction
of rates of return by 1.5 percentage points.108 Financial institutions
regularly change their fee structures making it difficult for workers
to see the total costs of fees.'0 9
Not all administrative costs are covered by these fees. The
costs incurred by the UK government in overseeing the system are
taken out of general revenue."0 Workers lose additional money
because their contributions stay with the government for 18
months before they are placed in workers' accounts. Workers do
no receive any interest for the 18 months that their contributions sit
with the government. This holding period was specifically
structured to trim administrative costs."'
The UK has taken steps to force the financial institutions to
disclose the costs of fees on workers' accounts. Financial
institutions must publish information on rates of return before and
after fees have been levied. Nonetheless, administrative costs still
run quite high. One study reports that fees cost workers between
40 and 45 percent of the value of their account."'
SWEDEN
Sweden has designed its individual account system in a
way that minimizes administrative costs. The creation of the PPM
105 Liu, supra note 10, at 36.
106 Turner, supra note 3, at 38; see also ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, supra note 46,
at 3; see also Blake, supra note 15, at 9.
107 Turner, supra note 3, at 63.
108 CBO, supra note 1, at 39.
109 Blake, supra note 15, at 9.
110 Turner, supra note 3, at 64.
111 Blake, supra note 15, at 3.
112 Id. at 9; see also Turner, supra note 3, at 63; see also ADMINISTRATIVE
COSTS, supra note 46, at 3; see also GAO, supra note 8, at 42.
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is instrumental to keeping administrative costs low, in part because
of scale economies." 3 In particular, processing everything through
a central administration allows for the low administrative costs.
114
For instance, "centralizing all of the paperwork associated with the
maintenance of the individual accounts will allow this function to
be performed much more efficiently than if performed individually
by each fund."' 15 The central agency also lowers administrative
costs because the PPM can "match buy and sell orders internally,
limiting its transaction with the actual fund operator to the net
amount of all of the individual transactions.
11 6
To prevent the high administrative costs arising from sales
and advertising costs, Sweden has negated the need for a sales
staff. To begin with, mutual fund management companies only
know the total investment from PPM, not the individual investors.
Thus, the mutual fund management company only needs to offer
investment management services and does not need to acquire
distribution channels, avoiding the need for a sales staff,
commissions and the like.'1
7
The fee arrangement includes a .3 percent charge on
account balances and a money management fee. Both are charged
annually by the mutual fund but the entire .3 percent charge is
transferred to the PPM. The money management fee has to be the
same that the mutual fund charges outside of the PPM system,
which serves to keep this fee lower than otherwise could be
expected. A portion of the money management fee is returned to
the PPM because it covers the majority of administrative functions.
The PPM then passes those rebates on to participants. 8 The fees
paid to the PPM by financial institutions will help make the PPM
self-financing in the future.1"
113 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 2.
114 Tedrow, supra note 29, at 54.
115 Thompson, supra note 31.
116 id.; see also INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26,
at 3.
"' INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 5; see
also Turner, supra note 3, at 57; see also Thompson, supra note 31.
11 Turner, supra note 3, at 71-72.
119 ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, supra note 46, at 2.
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By focusing on reducing administrative costs, Sweden has
kept its administrative costs extremely low. Total administrative
costs are about half of Chile's administrative costs. 120 Because of
the relatively short period that the PPM system has existed, rates of
return are hard to find. In constructing a system with low
administrative costs, Sweden compromised in other areas of the
pension system most notably by maintaining a long holding period
between receiving contributions and depositing them into the PPM.
IMPLICATIONS TO THE US
Using a government agency to collect contributions and run
the entire pension system has been helpful in reducing costs in
both Sweden and the UK. The US would face special difficulties
in implementing such a system because of its much larger
population. On top of the almost 20,000 employees currently
working in the Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
program, an estimated 7,700 to 33,600 more employees would be
needed if the US modeled their system upon Sweden's system.1
2 1
However, the large size of the US would help minimize
administrative costs by larger scale economies. That means, with
detailed planning, a reformed pension system in the US could keep
administrative costs even lower than Sweden which already has
much lower administrative costs when compared to other
countries.
The type of individual account system in place - mandatory
or voluntary carve-outs - is another important characteristic that
highly influences the administrative costs. Even with a
governmental agency in place, the UK's administrative costs run
high because of the complexity of the system (i.e. workers can
opting in to and out of the APP system whenever they wish and
varying rebates from NIF depending on age). It is the simplicity of
the Swedish system, coupled with innovative procedures (like
negating transaction fees) that have resulted in low administrative
costs.
120 Turner, supra note 3, at 62.
121 ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, supra note 46, at 3.
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Finally, the UK has reduced administrative costs by
holding contributions for long periods of time before placing them
in individual accounts, whereas Chile's processing occurs at a
much faster rate. Regulations for US 401(k) plans require that
contributions are credited into the individual's account by the 15th
business day of the month following the contribution, 22 so it is
likely that Americans will not be willing to wait extended periods
of time, which they are not accustomed to. The Swedish system
which guarantees a rate of return during its holding period may be
more acceptable to Americans than the UK's system.
Administrative costs in a pension system involving
individual accounts will probably be higher than that found in the
current Social Security system. However, the Swedish system
demonstrates that the government can keep administrative costs
low if that is a goal when creating the pension system.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR WOMEN
Under various proposals utilizing individual accounts to
reform the Social Security system, women and men may fare
differently. Major concerns for women include length of time in
the work force and spousal and survivor's benefits.
LENGTH OF TIME IN WORK FORCE
As a group, women tend to spend less time in the work
force than their male counterparts. Though women are
experiencing growth in labor force participation rates, they
are still more likely than men to be out of the labor
force at any age, to experience discontinuous work
histories, and to be employed part time - all of
122 Blake, supra note 15, at 5.
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which have implications for their ability to accrue
pension credits and save for retirement.123
If Social Security reform includes requirements for a longer benefit
computation period, many women would not be able to fulfill the
requirement or would have to work to an older age before they
would be eligible. For instance, if the benefit computation period
for Social Security was 38 years in 1999, only 15 percent of
retiring women would have qualified compared to 57 percent of
men. 1
24
The Chilean reform raised similar issues. On average, for
every year that men contribute to the pension system, women
contribute seven tenths of a year. By the time that benefits are paid
out, women are projected to receive 30-45% of men's benefits. As
a result, it is anticipated that women will comprise 70% of
Chileans receiving the guaranteed minimum pension.
This is a key part of Social Security reform that women
must understand. Increases in benefit computation period would
affect women currently contributing to the Social Security as well
as generations to come. Decisions to stay home with children,
even until the kids reach school age, could drastically worsen the
financial situations of parents when they reach retirement age.
Failing to qualify for Social Security benefits would force women
to rely on spousal and survivor's benefits available to them.
SURVIVOR AND SPOUSAL BENEFITS
Survivor and spousal benefits help to keep individuals
above poverty by providing a source of income independent of
their own work experience. Every married man in Chile is
required to buy a joint annuity when he decides to receive his
123 SARA E. RIX AND JOHN B. WILLIAMSON, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE,
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: HOW MIGHT WOMEN FARE? 2 (1998), available at
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/ib3 Isswomen.pdf
124Id. at 16.
125 Korczyk, supra note 13, at 13.
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benefits in annuity form. 126 In contrast, married women only have
to buy a joint annuity when their husband is disabled. Overall,
spousal benefits are expected to increase women's benefits from
30 - 45 percent to 70 - 90 percent of married men's benefits in
Chile because the spousal benefits are in addition to any benefits
they have earned on their own work history.127 While this feature
is extremely beneficial to married women, single women fare no
better under the reformed Chilean pension system.12
The UK provides a different strategy to entitle women to
survivor benefits. The surviving spouse is entitled to a basic state
pension benefit arising from the work record of their spouse,
regardless of the pension system the spouse was enrolled in. When
the surviving spouse does not have enough years contributing to
the pension system, they can receive up to 60% of the basic state
pension based on their spouse's earnings. 129 Additionally, married
men are required to provide a 50% survivor's benefit when they
annuitize.'3 0
When considering reforming the American pension system
using individual accounts, women should be better off if there is a
requirement that mandates husbands (and wives when their earning
record allows) to have a joint annuity. Additionally, it would be
best for women if annuities were based on a unisex life charts.
Unisex life charts mean that the benefit amount is calculated on an
average life expectancy for the American population. Since
women have a longer life expectancy than men, they would receive
higher benefit payments than if the annuity was calculated based
gender specific life expectancy. Thus, in retirement, money would
be reallocated from men to women.'
126 Joint annuities provide benefits for life for the two people they cover. Id. at
14.121Id. at 14.
128 Single women are an important section of the retired Chilean population
because divorce does not exist in Chile. Annulment, which implies that a legal
marriage never existed, is the only option. This severely limits former spouses'
rights to pension benefits. Id. at 14-15.
129 1d. at 30.
130 Blake, supra note 15, at 4.
131 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS: LESSONS FROM SWEDEN, supra note 26, at 9.
2008
126 BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL. Vol. XVI
CONCLUSION
Countries that have already reformed their pension systems
to include individual accounts provide the US a wealth of
information to help guide the American debate. They have
developed diverse systems that fit the needs of their respective
country. The US has to decide which features or aspects of a
pension system are most desirable and focus on those features.
Compromises in one area might be necessary to reach the goals in
another area as exemplified by the Swedish in settling for longer
holding periods in exchange for having lower administrative costs.
